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In a series of papers, Martin Weitzman has proposed a Dismal Theorem. The general 
idea is that, under limited conditions concerning the structure of uncertainty and 
preferences, society has an indefinitely large expected loss from high-consequence, 
low-probability events. Under such conditions, standard economic analysis cannot 
be applied. The present study is intended to put the Dismal Theorem in context and 
examine the range of its applicability, with an application to catastrophic climate 
change. I conclude that Weitzman makes an important point about selection of 
distributions in the analysis of decision-making under uncertainty. However, the 
conditions necessary for the Dismal Theorem to hold are limited and do not apply to 
a wide range of potential uncertain scenarios. 
   Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330454
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  I.  The Dismal Theorem 
  In a series of papers, Martin Weitzman has proposed what he calls a Dismal 
Theorem. He summarizes the theorem as follows: “[T]he catastrophe-insurance 
aspect of such a fat-tailed unlimited-exposure situation, which can never be fully 
learned away, can dominate the social-discounting aspect, the pure-risk aspect, and 
the consumption-smoothing aspect.” The general idea is that under limited 
conditions concerning the structure of uncertainty and preferences, the expected loss 
from certain risks such as climate change is infinite, and standard economic analysis 
cannot be applied. 
  He summarizes his application to climate change as follows: “The burden of 
proof in climate-change CBA {cost-benefit analysis} is presumptively upon whoever 
calculates expected discounted utilities without considering that structural 
uncertainty might matter more than discounting or pure risk. Such a middle-of-the-
distribution modeler should be prepared to explain why the bad fat tail of the 
posterior-predictive PDF is not empirically relevant and does not play a very 
significant – perhaps even decisive – role in climate-change CBA.”1  
  These points are potentially of great importance for both economic modeling 
and for economic analyses of climate change. The purpose of this note is to put the 
Dismal Theorem in context and analyze the range of its applicability. I conclude that 
Weitzman raises critical issues about the selection of distributions in the analysis of 
decision-making under uncertainty. However, the assumptions underlying the 
theorems are very strong, so the broad claim to have reversed the burden of proof 
on the use of expected utility analysis needs to be qualified. 
A. A Heuristic Version of the Dismal Theorem 
  The basic proposition under the Dismal Theorem is that with “fat tailed” 
distributions, expected utility analysis may behave in an unintuitive way. This arises 
                                                 
1 There are multiple iterations on the Dismal Theorem. These quotations are from Martin L. 
Weitzman, “On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change,” 
July 7, 2008, forthcoming The Review of Economics and Statistics. I am grateful for comments 
on these issues from William Brainard, Gary Yohe, Richard Tol, and Martin Weitzman. 
Version is weitz_010909.docx. because distributions with fat tails are ones for which the probabilities of rare events 
decline relatively slowly as the event moves far away from its central tendency.2  
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≠
  An early example of the difficulty, closely related to the Dismal Theorem, was 
derived by John Geweke in 2001.3 Geweke was concerned about the use of constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility in the context of Bayesian learning in economic-
growth models. Recall that a CRRA utility function is of the form 
, where c is a measure of consumption and
1 () / ( 1 ) ,  f o r   1 ,
α αα
− =− Uc c α  is the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption [ () l n () ,  w h e n   1 α = = Uc c ]. Weitzman 
usually takes the elasticity to be  1 α > , and I will follow that convention in this 
discussion. A central assumption in both Geweke’s and in Weitzman’s analyses is 
that consumption has a structural uncertainty that is lognormally distributed: 
(1) ln( ) cc ε =+ 
where
2 (0, ), with mean   and standard deviation  . N ε σ μ σ ∼  
  Geweke provided a number of examples of expected utility in which expected 
utility would exist (be finite) or would be unbounded depending upon the value of 
α  and the probability distribution of consumption. For example, if consumption is 
lognormally distributed with known mean and variance, then expected utility exists 
(is finite) for all α . A degenerate case comes when consumption is log-normally 
distributed with unknown mean and unknown variance, and when the parameters 
of the distribution are derived from Bayesian updating. In this case, the distribution 
                                                 
2  There is no generally accepted definition of the term “fat tails,” also sometimes called 
“heavy tails.” (1) One set of definitions divides distributions into three classes. A thin-tailed 
distribution has a finite domain (such as the uniform), a medium-tailed distribution has 
exponentially declining tails (such as the normal), and a fat-tailed distribution has power-
law tails (such as the Pareto distribution). See Eugene F. Schuster, ”Classification of 
Probability Laws by Tail Behavior,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 79, No. 
388, Dec., 1984, pp. 936-939.  (2) Weitzman proposes a new definition, that a fat-tailed 
distribution is one whose moment generating function is infinite. As we will see below, this 
is also the condition for the Dismal Theorem, so it is tautological. We will also see that 
within a class of distributions the condition will depend on incidental parameters such as 
the degrees of freedom. 
3 John Geweke, “A note on some limitations of CRRA utility,” Economic Letters, 71, 2001, 
341–345. of the parameters is a normal-gamma distribution and the expected utility is 
unbounded (negative infinity) for  1 α ≠ . This example is of particular interest 
because the sampling distribution for the standard deviation of a normal 
distribution is a t-distribution, which is in the gamma family. In Geweke’s language, 
the existence of expected utility is “fragile” with respect to changes in the 
distributions of random variables or changes in prior information. Fragile in this 
context denotes that with CRRA the expected utility exists with some distributions 
but not for others. 
  Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem is closely related to Geweke’s. I interpret the 
Dismal Theorem as being about the potentially disastrous effects of taking or not 
taking policies, such as policies to slow global warming. An effective policy will be 
interpreted here as preventing climate change, so the policy variable is set at one (P 
= 1). An ineffective policy will allow climate change, so the policy variable is set at 
zero (P = 0). Using this convention, we can rewrite Weitzman’s model as a variant of 
equation Geweke’s equation (1) by adding the explicit policy variable: 
ε μ =++ − (2) ln( ) ( 1) cc P  
In Weitzman’s climate-change analysis, μ  is the critical uncertain parameter, which 
is a generalized temperature sensitivity coefficient (called TSC in the discussion 
below). If policy is effective, then P = 1 and μ(P-1) = 0, while if policy is ineffective, 
then P ≠ 1 and μ(P-1) ≠ 0. In this framework, P is the policy variable and μ is an 
uncertain policy multiplier. Weitzman assumes that the policy multiplier μ is 
uncertain and is distributed as 
2 ( , ) . N μ μμ σ ∼ He then shows that expected utility is 
unbounded in a situation of Bayesian learning, although the same result would hold 
with classical sampling theory. 
  For this analysis, we can provisionally take ε = 0. Further assume that policy is a 
(0, 1) variable, such as (“weak climate-change policies, effective climate-change 
policies”). We can then translate the Weitzman model into the Geweke model in a 
straightforward way. Weitzman assumes that the policy multiplier μ is unknown 
and normally distributed, but observers must learn about it by sampling from 
history or models. To simplify, assume that we are operating in a classical 
framework. Then, if the underlying distribution of μ is normal, the estimated policy 
multiplier (call it  ˆ μ ) has a t-distribution, which is fat-tailed in Weitzman’s 
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 framework (although it is either medium-tailed or fat-tailed depending upon the 
degrees of freedom using our terminology of footnote 2). 
  Given all this, we see that if the policy variable takes a value of P = 0 (which is 
ineffective policy and therefore implies climate change) then we have the result that 
the expected utility for the CRRA utility function is unbounded (negative infinity). 
This arises because the policy multiplier μ has the t-distribution. This is Weitzman’s 
Dismal Theorem. 
 
B.   An simplified version of the Dismal Theorem 
  This idea behind the Dismal Theorem can be understood intuitively as follows.4 
Recall that in the CRRA framework, the utility function is 
1 () Uc c
α − − ∼  (we work 
always with α > 1). A high value of α signifies high risk-aversion or inequality-
aversion. Consider a fat-tailed probability distribution such as a power law. For 
small c, this implies that . Note in this context that a low value of k 
signifies a distribution with a fatter tail.  
() , 0
k fc c k > ∼
Define the conditional utility at consumption level c (which denoted the 
probability times utility) as  () ( ) ( )   Vc fc Uc = .  For this specification, 
( ) ( ) ( )
11  
α α −+ − = −
kk c =− ∼ Vc fc Uc cc .  The question is what happens to the 
conditional utility as c tends to zero. For the Dismal Theorem to hold, V(c) should go 
to minus infinity quickly as c approaches zero. The expected utility [the integral of 
V(c)] over the interval between zero and some positive level of consumption, c , 
converges to a finite number as  if and only if  0 c → 20 k α + −> . 
We can take for illustrative purposes an example where α = 1.5 and k = 2.5. In 
this case, the conditional utility is 
11 . 52 . 5 2 () .
− + −= − ∼ Vc c c
−
                                                
 A minimal amount of 
calculation will show that this combination of parameters leads to bounded 
expected utility. On the other hand, assume that α = 2.5 and k = 1, in which case the 
 
4 Weitzman usually works with the expected value of marginal utility, while we focus on 
the expected value of utility. The parameter conditions for divergence are slightly different 
for the two, but the general insights are the same. 
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 conditional utility is  For this case, both expected utility and 
expected marginal utility are unbounded. 
1 2.5 1 0.5 () .
−+ − = ∼ Vc c c
The intuition behind these results is straightforward: The Dismal Theorem 
holds if the distribution is not only fat tailed but very fait tailed (meaning that k is 
small), or if the utility function shows not only risk aversion but very high risk-
aversion (meaning that α is large).  
While this example simplifies the logic of the argument, it shows some 
important points. It shows that fat tails per se are not sufficient to lead to unbounded 
expected utility or expected marginal utility. Moreover, the question of finiteness 
depends upon both the parameters of the utility function and the parameters of the 
preference function. Note as well that this example involves the distribution of the 
level of consumption, whereas Weitzman’s analysis involves the distribution of the 
log of consumption, so there is yet another important assumption involving what 
variable the fat-tailed distribution applies to. Finally, in this example, the 
exponential distribution, which Weitzman identifies as fat-tailed but we have called 
“medium-tailed” (see footnote 3), leads to a finite expected utility or marginal utility 
in all cases. 
C.  Some key features of the Dismal Theorem 
  The Dismal Theorem depends upon some special assumptions. First, it is 
necessary that the value of the utility function tends to minus infinity (or to plus 
infinity for marginal utility) as consumption tends to zero. This first condition holds 
for all CRRA utility functions with  1 α > , but not for many other utility functions. 
Second, it is necessary that the (posterior) probability distribution of consumption 
has “fat tails.” The fat tails for the distribution of consumption means that the 
probability associated with low values of consumption declines less rapidly than the 
marginal utility of consumption increases. We discuss these questions in turn.  
 Utility  with  near-zero consumption 
  We first discuss some problems that arise with CRRA for near-zero 
consumption. The CRRA functions that Weitzman analyzes (with  1 α > ) assume that 
zero consumption has utility of minus negative infinity (and unbounded positive 
marginal utility) as consumption goes to zero. This has the unattractive and 
unrealistic feature that societies would pay unlimited amounts to prevent an 
 
- 6 - 
 infinitesimal probability of zero consumption. For example, assume that there is a 
very, very tiny probability that a killer asteroid might hit Earth, and further assume 
that we can deflect that asteroid for an expenditure of $10 trillion. The CRRA utility 
function implies that we would spend the $10 trillion no matter how small was the 
probability. Even if the probability were 10-10, 10-20, or even 10-1,000,000, we would 
spend a large fraction of world income to avoid these infinitesimally small outcomes 
(short of going extinct to prevent extinction). 
  An alternative would be to assume that near-zero consumption is extremely but 
not infinitely undesirable. This is analogous in the health literature to assuming that 
the value of avoiding an individual’s statistical death is finite. To be realistic, 
societies tolerate a tiny probability of zero consumption if preventing zero 
consumption is ruinously expensive. I consider some possible bounds in the next 
section. 
  Fat tails and the distribution of parameters 
  The second crucial condition for the Dismal Theorem is that the probability 
distribution of consumption has “fat tails” as consumption approaches zero. 
Recalling equation (2) above, Weitzman derives this by assuming a very specific 
functional form for the distribution of consumption. The condition is that the 
structural distribution of consumption is lognormal, the uncertain policy multiplier 
is normally distributed, and knowledge about the distribution of the policy 
multiplier is attained through sampling or Bayesian learning.5 
  However, the results are not robust to minor changes in specifications. For 
example, a finite upper limit might be placed on the policy multiplier, perhaps, in 
Weitzman’s example of the temperature sensitivity coefficient, from fundamental 
physics. Alternatively, the underlying distribution of the policy multiplier might be 
uniform or a distribution of μ that, with sampling, leads to a distribution of  ˆ μ  that 
                                                 
5 Weitzman’s analysis contains a discussion of a Bayesian analysis of the Dismal Theorem. 
He relies on the application of a “non-dogmatic prior distribution” in the form of a 
generalized power law,  ()  
k p μ μ
− ∝ [using the notation of equation (2)] with a limiting 
argument as k → ∞. I believe that the results can be obtained using an improper infinite 
uniform prior, which provides the same intuition as the classical discussion in the text.     
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has thin tails. There is little reason to think that the particular distribution used in 
the analysis is the correct one. 
  The statistical approach in equation (2) proceeds in the absence of any prior 
information. This is not the way that most natural or social scientists derive their 
subjective distributions about the key parameters of important questions such as 
those regarding climate change, monetary policy, or tax policy. In doing statistical 
estimates of the radius of the universe, physicists might require that the parameter 
be non-negative. In the case of the temperature sensitivity, most of current 
knowledge comes from the application of physical principles, and until recently, 
none of scientists’ judgments on the temperature sensitivity coefficient came from 
sampling of historical data. In general, subjective distributions on scientific 
parameters are derived from time series, expert opinion, statistical analyses, theory, 
and similar sources. There would seem little reason to force this complex process 
into the straightjacket of the model in equation (2). 
  The conclusion here is that the Dismal Theorem rests on two important 
assumptions. First, the use of the CRRA utility function leads to unbounded 
negative utility as consumption approaches zero, yet this assumption leads to 
unacceptable conclusions in a wide variety of other circumstances. Second, the 
analysis relies on a very special set of assumptions about probability distributions – 
the lognormal distribution of the policy multipliers with no prior bounds on its 
values and a value determined by statistical sampling. The Dismal Theorem would 
not generally hold without both of these very special assumptions. 
 
II. Further Analysis of the Dismal Theorem 
   I next comment on Weitzman’s numerical examples as well as his criticisms of 
existing economic models. I begin with a general observation. Weitzman’s analysis 
is a useful reminder that analysts should think carefully about the distribution 
functions of parameters when undertaking an analysis of uncertainties. In particular, 
the counterintuitive nature of fat-tailed distributions, where “23-sigma” events can 
happen in historical time, needs to be part of any serious analysis of risk. The events in financial markets of 1987, 1998, and 2008 are useful reminders of that important 
and oft-neglected point.6 
  The question addressed here is, does the Dismal Theory apply as a general rule 
and in particular to climate change.  
A.  Estimates of the temperature-sensitivity coefficient (TSC) 
  The central example in Weitzman’s exposition of the Dismal Theorem is the 
example of the temperature sensitivity coefficient. To begin with, he assumes that 
the TSC enters in a multiplicative way as shown in equation (2). For our purpose, we 
can rewrite equation (2) as:  
2200 2200 (3) ln( ) ln( ) ( cc T S C f P) =+ ×  
  This equation relates the log of consumption two hundred years in the future 
(which is the date that Weitzman identifies) to a base value and the product of the 
TSC and f(P). I interpret P as a climate-change policy variable in which f(P) = 0 when 
effective climate change policies are taken (perhaps zero net carbon emissions over 
the next two centuries), and f(P) = 1 for a business-as-usual case of rapid growth in 
carbon emissions over the next two centuries. Weitzman does not introduce an 
explicit policy variable such as P, but it is implicit in the analysis and discussion of 
policy and models. 
  Weitzman’s estimates of the temperature sensitivity coefficient (TSC) 
  The central empirical component of Weitzman’s analysis is that the posterior 
distribution of TSC is extremely dispersed. I quote Weitzman’s analysis at length:7 
  In this paper I am mostly concerned with the roughly 15% of those TSC1 “values 
substantially higher than 4.5 °C” which “cannot be excluded” {by the IPCC Fourth 
                                                 
6 The example of stock prices is a useful one. Prices on U.S. stock markets fell approximately 
23 percent on October 19, 1987. An estimate of the daily standard deviation of price change 
over the 1950-1986 period (assuming a finite variance) shows a standard deviation of 1 
percent. A 23-sigma event has vanishingly small probability for a normal distribution. 
7 Weitzman, op. cit., pp. 5, 7. Note that I have for convenience of exposition changed 
Weitzman’s S1 and S2 to TSC1 and TSC2 to conform to the notation used here. 
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Assessment’s Summary}. A grand total of twenty-two peer-reviewed studies of climate 
sensitivity published recently in reputable scientific journals and encompassing a wide 
variety of methodologies (along with 22 imputed PDFs of TSC1) lie indirectly behind 
the above-quoted IPCC-AR4 (2007) summary statement. These 22 recent scientific 
studies cited by IPCC-AR4 are compiled in Table 9.3 and Box 10.2. It might be argued 
that these 22 studies are of uneven reliability and their complicatedly-related PDFs 
cannot easily be combined, but for the simplistic purposes of this illustrative example I 
do not perform any kind of formal Bayesian model-averaging or meta-analysis (or 
even engage in informal cherry picking). Instead I just naively assume that all 22 
studies have equal credibility and for my purposes here their PDFs can be 
simplistically aggregated. The upper 5% probability level averaged over all 22 climate-
sensitivity studies cited in IPCC-AR4 (2007) is °7 C while the median is 6.4 °C, which I 
take as signifying approximately that P[TSC1 > 7 °C] ≈ 5%. Glancing at Table 9.3 and 
Box 10.2 of IPCC-AR4, it is apparent that the upper tails of these 22 PDFs tend to be 
sufficiently long and fat that one is allowed from a simplistically-aggregated PDF of 
these 22 studies the rough approximation P[TSC1 > 10 °C] ≈ 1%. 
  Instead of TSC1, which stands for climate sensitivity narrowly defined, I work 
throughout the rest of this paper with TSC2, which (abusing scientific terminology 
somewhat here) stands for a more abstract “generalized climate-sensitivity-like scaling 
parameter” that includes heat-induced feedbacks on the forcing from the above-
mentioned releases of naturally-sequestered GHGs, increased respiration of soil 
microbes, climate-stressed forests, and other weakening of natural carbon sinks. 
Without further ado I just assume for purposes of this simplistic example that P[TSC2 > 
10 °C] ≈ 5% and P[TSC2 > 20 °C] ≈ 1%, implying that anthropogenic doubling of CO2-e 
eventually causes P[ΔT > 10 °C] ≈ 5% and P[ΔT > 20 °C] ≈ 1%, which I take as my base-
case tail estimates in what follows. 
  Many people would agree that a 5 percent chance of a 10 °C change, or a 1 
percent chance of a 20 °C change, would be a catastrophic prospect for human 
societies. However, the procedures used to derive these numbers are flawed. I first 
review the technique used by Weitzman to derive the TSC and then show an 
alternative method. 
  Weitzman’s estimates are in the spirit of a meta-analysis of existing statistical 
studies of the TSC. The problem with his procedure is the following. If we have 
studies with any statistical independence, then we would never take the average of 
the 95th or the 99th percentile as the appropriate estimate of those percentiles of the 
underlying distribution. Those numbers might be reasonable estimates of the 95th or the 99th percentile of the next study, but they are not good estimates of the 
percentiles of the underlying distribution. The appropriate procedure is to start with 
the underlying distributions, then combine them into a meta-distribution, and 
calculate the percentiles from the combined distribution. The Weitzman procedure 
will be correct only if the studies are drawn from exactly the same data, so that the 
distributions have a perfect correlation. This is clearly not the case, as an 
examination of the sources, methods, and the distributions makes clear. 
  One key to the problem with this procedure is the treatment of the Gregory et 
al. study. That study reports a 95th percentile of ∞, which is probably because of low 
power at the high end. If this were included, then under Weitzman’s procedure, the 
95th percentile would also be ∞. 
  An example will make the point. Suppose we want to estimate the 95th 
percentile of the estimated mean for a random normal variable, Y, for which we 
have 10,010 independent observations. We divide the observations into group A 
with the first 10 observations and group B with the next 10,000 observations. If we 
take 10,010 random draws of Y assuming  then the 95th percentile of the 
estimated mean for the first group is 0.699, while the 95th percentile for the second 
group is 0.01956. Under the Weitzman procedure, we would average these to get an 
overall standard deviation of 0.359. The correct answer is to combine the two, which 
yields a 95th percentile of the estimated mean of 0.01955. 
∼ (0,1), YN
  A final point involves Weitzman’s procedure of moving from TSC1 to TSC2. 
Recall that the latter concept involves Weitzman’s idea that the sensitivity may be 
much larger when other feedback mechanisms are included. While there can be little 
doubt that the current climate models do not capture all possible effects, Weitzman 
has provided no empirical foundation for his doubling of the TSC percentiles, nor 
has he considered the time scale on which these further feedbacks would occur. 
  A Simplified Meta-analysis of Studies of the TSC 
  One approach to examining the TSC would be to combine different studies of 
that parameter. I will illustrate a simple meta-analysis that relies upon the published 
studies reviewed in the IPCC-AR4. Of these, ten studies provide ranges from which 
the distributions can be calculated (Forest, Andronova, Knutti, Frame, Forster, 
Wigley, Hegerl, Schneider, Murphy, and Plani). The distributions are from Table 9.2. 
The average of the medians is 3.1 °C, and the average of the 95th percentiles is 8.4 °C. 
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If we use Weitzman’s approach, we get close to his answer for the mean value of 
TSC1. However, if we take a simple meta-statistical procedure in which we assume 
that these are independent draws from the correct distribution, we estimate that the 
95th percentile is 5.0 °C if we do not weight the different estimates, and 4.6 °C if we 
weight the studies according to their precision (measured as the square root of the 
log of the 5-95 range). This compares with Weitzman’s estimates of 7 °C for the 95th 
percentile of TSC1 and 7 °C for the 95th percentile of TSC2. 
  These estimates are meant to be illustrative only and not to provide the best 
meta-analysis of different studies of the TSC. A particularly difficult issue is the fact 
that different studies rely on similar data (such as the instrumental temperature 
record), so the estimates are not independent. However, the point of this section is 
not to propose a new distribution but only to show that Weitzman’s estimates are 
based on an inappropriate technique. 
B.  Alternative Approaches to the Lower Bound on Utility    
  What does “zero consumption” actually mean? 
  The Dismal Theorem concerns evaluating situations where consumption 
approaches “zero.” What exactly do we mean by zero consumption? Weitzman 
describes the zero level as the end of “statistical civilization as we know it, or 
perhaps even ... of statistical life on earth...” Note that, formally, the analysis does 
not actually analyze “zero consumption” but takes the limit as consumption 
approaches zero. Zero consumption is an ambiguous concept. Is zero consumption 
(1) declining average consumption of a fixed number of people, or (2) high average 
consumption of a declining number of people, or (3) high average consumption of 
thriving civilizations for a statistically declining period? I suspect most people 
would have a different view of the undesirability of these three alternative 
approaches to zero. 
  Some approaches to a lower bound 
  How can we think about societal valuation of “zero consumption?” Take the 
third of the possible approaches to “zero consumption” of the last section (an end of 
human civilizations as we know them). This is the number that Weitzman takes to 
be unboundedly negative.  
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  Is this really the way people decide about catastrophic events, to put infinite 
disutility on them? Clearly not. This question has been contemplated from time to 
time. It arose about two decades ago in the context of “nuclear winter,” which was 
the theory that the detonation of a large number of nuclear weapons would lower 
global temperatures so much as to kill off most if not all of humanity.8 More 
recently, there has been a spirited debate about “strangelets” and black holes 
triggered by heavy ion collisions in large colliders.9 I believe that most 
knowledgeable scientists would regard these as events with positive (if very low) 
probabilities, and they are definitely catastrophic. The low probabilities of 
catastrophic outcomes were not, however, enough to induce people to dismantle all 
but a few nuclear weapons or to stop the experiments in colliders. 
  One example will illustrate the issue. I would judge that the most secure 
example of a well-defined catastrophic risk is killer asteroids. An asteroid such as 
the one at the K/T (Cretaceous/Tertiary) boundary, which had a diameter of around 
10 km, would probably be sufficiently large to destroy human civilizations. These 
are estimated to have a probability of Earth collision of about 10-8 per year.10 Under 
Weitzman’s CRRA utility function, we should devote an unlimited fraction of our 
resources to reduce that probability by even a small amount. Yet we are at present 
spending only $4 million per year to track hazardous asteroids. Some calculations 
indicate that with an outlay of $1 billion per year we could reduce the probability of 
impact by at least 90 percent, but this sum is apparently not worth the avoided risk. 
(I do not make a case that these numbers are accurate but that they are probably 
 
8 One of the most influential studies was R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. 
Pollack and Carl Sagan, “Nuclear winter: global consequences of multiple nuclear 
explosions,” Science, 222, 23 December 1983, pp. 1283-1292. This was generally disregarded 
after further studies. However, recent work has done new modeling and found disturbing 
results, see Michael J. Mills, Owen B. Toon, Richard P. Turco, Douglas E. Kinnison, and 
Rolando R. Garcia, “Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear 
conflict,” Proc. National Acad. Sci. (US), pp. 5307-5312, 2008.   
9 Arnon Dar, A. De Rújula, and Ulrich Heinz, “Will Relativistic Heavy Ion Colliders Destroy 
Our Planet?” A. Dar et al., Physics Letters B, 470 142-148 (1999); hep-ph/9910471 and R.L. 
Jaffea, W. Buszaa, J. Sandweiss, and F. Wilczek, “Review of Speculative ‘Disaster Scenarios’ 
at RHIC,“ Review of Modern Physics, 72, pp. 1125-1140, 2000. 
10 Clark R. Chapman and David Morrison, “Impacts on the Earth by asteroids and comets: 
assessing the hazard,” Nature, 367, 33 – 40, 06 January 1994.  
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within one or two orders of magnitude of the right numbers, which is sufficient for 
this discussion.) If we take this as an outcome of reasoned choice, these numbers 
would imply that the negative utility of human extinction is somewhere between 
$1015 and $1017. For reference purposes, the discounted value of world consumption 
is in the order of $1016. So to a first approximation the asteroid example looks more 
like the outcome of linear utility rather than of highly risk-averse utility.11 
  To summarize, societies do not behave as if catastrophic outcomes have 
unbounded negative disutility. Perhaps, the Dismal Theorem is really a warning 
about applying the CRRA function to situations where consumption might be very 
small. If people are concerned about catastrophic impacts of climate change (as in 
near-zero consumption), then they should revisit their assumption about the utility 
function. This is one of the implications of the Dismal Theorem. 
  Where does the Dismal Theorem apply? 
  One interpretation of the Dismal Theorem is that we cannot be sure that 
consumption will not be zero or near-zero with 100 percent certainty. In fact, there is 
very little that we can rule out with 100 percent probability in most areas. However, 
if a positive probability of zero consumption were a worry for climate change, it 
would hold in a wide variety of circumstances in which we are highly uncertain (or 
not completely certain) about the technology or societal impacts. Example would 
include biotechnology, strangelets, runaway computer systems, nuclear 
proliferation, rogue weeds and bugs, nanotechnology, emerging tropical diseases, 
alien invaders, asteroids, enslavement by advanced robots, and so on. Like global 
warming, all of these have deep uncertainty – indeed, they may have greater 
uncertainty because there are fewer well-understood constants in the biological and 
technological world than in the geophysical world. So, if we accept the Dismal 
Theorem, we would probably dissolve in a sea of anxiety at the prospect of the 
infinity of infinitely bad outcomes. 
 
11 This is a very rough calculation as follows. Current world market consumption is in the 
order of $50 x 1012, and we might increase this by a factor of 2 to include non-market 
consumption. With a growth rate of 1 percent per year and a real discount rate of 2 percent 
per year, this would be a present value of $1016.   
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  Weitzman dismisses such anxieties. On the question of application to other 
areas, Weitzman says that these are “very very unlikely,” whereas catastrophic 
climate change is “very unlikely.” Other scientists come to very different 
conclusions. One example is Freeman Dyson, who believes that we are on the 
threshold of developing new technologies that can scrub carbon from the 
atmosphere at low cost.12 To take another example, Ray Kurzweil argues strongly 
for the need to protect from the “GNR” (genetics, nanotechnology, robotics) 
revolution but believes that low-cost and clean energy will be attainable in two or 
three decades?13 
  What is “no policy”? 
  An additional question concerns how to interpret the “no policy” case. From a 
formal point of view, we can put this point in terms of Weitzman’s equation in 
equation (2). A critical part of his analysis is the implicit assumption that the policy 
variable is of the (0, 1) variety. In this framework, “zero” is interpreted as “no 
change,” as in no climate change, no research on biotechnology or nanotechnology, 
no international trade in dangerous viruses, no self-replicating robots, and the like. 
However, it is hard to think of anything that is truly a “zero” policy. And we would 
need to worry that slowing activities in any of these areas would take us in more 
dangerous directions, perhaps reducing the possibility of detecting nuclear 
proliferation or finding antidotes to lethal pandemics. 
  In the case of climate change case, “no policy” is a troublesome concept. The 
estimated radiative forcings from long-lived greenhouse gases are already more 
than half of the way to a doubling of CO2-equivalent forcings. If the expected utility 
of a doubling of CO2 equivalent is infinite negative utility, then a reading of 
equation (2) would indicate that this would apply equally well to half of a CO2 
doubling, or a tenth of a doubling, or even a single molecule of CO2. Moreover, since 
even doing nothing requires some affirmative steps in some dimension, perhaps 
everything we do would have negative infinite utility. 
  On learning 
 
12 See Freeman Dyson, “The Question of Global Warming,” The New York Review of Books, 
vol. 55, No. 10, June 12, 2008. 
13 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, Penguin, New York, 2005.  
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  There is an important difference here among these many potentially 
catastrophic outcomes in the potential for learning. (Richard Tol and Gary Yohe 
have made this general point in an important article.14) For some catastrophes, we 
have no possibility of learning and mid-course corrections. Strangelets are in this 
category. There is no point in revising our views about strangelets in the 
microsecond after we discover that the calculations of the physicists are wrong. No 
mid-course correction would be possible. Rogue bugs may be in the same category 
as strangelets with respect to learning: once they have escaped, they cannot be 
contained in the lab. Edward Teller suggested that the Trinity Test of an atomic 
bomb in 1945 might generate enough heat to ignite the atmosphere – a situation that 
could only be definitively answered by the test. 
  Climate change, by contrast, is a situation where we can learn as we go along. 
Every theory that allows for a climate sensitivity of more than 8 °C would also 
predict that we should see a very large warming now, with a rapid gradient over the 
next half-century.15 So we can learn, and then act when we learn, and perhaps even 
do some geoengineering while we learn some more or get our abatement policies or 
low-carbon technologies in place. In other words, if the Dismal Theorem were to 
apply, it would apply primarily to areas where we have no reasonable chance of 
learning and taking mid-course corrections after learning that things are heading 
toward a catastrophic outcome.  
 
III. What will produce catastrophic outcomes from climate change? 
  Weitzman raises the important issue of whether tail distributions may 
invalidate analyses of the economics of climate change, and in particular on cost-
benefit analyses (CBA) in integrated-assessment models (IAMs) used to tie together 
 
14  Gary Yohe and Richard Tol, “Precaution and a Dismal Theorem: Implications for Climate 
Policy and Climate Research,” in H. Geman, Risk Management in Commodity Markets, Wiley, 
New York, forthcoming. 
15  IPCC Fourth Assessment, Science [2007]. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, available online at http://ipcc-
wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/wg1-report.html, Chapter 10.  
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economic and geophysical relationships. Weitzman makes powerful generic 
criticisms of integrated assessment models. He writes that “the artificial crispness 
conveyed by conventional IAM-based CBAs  is especially and unusually misleading 
compared with more-ordinary non-climate-change CBA situations,” and that in this 
kind of analysis “an estimate might conceivably be arbitrarily inaccurate.”  
  There have been many studies using IAMs to investigate the implications of 
uncertainty. In my 2008 book, for example, I examined the effect on the DICE model 
of uncertainty for major parameters (including the temperature-sensitivity 
coefficient), and did not find anything approaching the catastrophic results that 
Weitzman predicted.16 Additionally, I tested for the sensitivity in the tails out to 6 
subjective standard deviations, using both a normal distribution for the parameters 
as well as a t-distribution, but did not find any of Weitzman’s hypothesized tail-
sensitivities. 
However, while most integrated-assessment models do not display 
catastrophic outcomes, no law of nature or economics guarantees that outcomes of 
rapid climate change will not be catastrophic. This section investigates the 
conditions under which extreme parameter values might produce catastrophic 
outcomes for climate change using a standard IAM. 17 
 
16 William D. Nordhaus, The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental 
Policy, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2008, available at 
http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/Balance_prepub.pdf.  
17 An alternative approach is to examine this question from a theoretical perspective. For 
example, Geoffrey Heal reviewed several studies and concluded, “There are several 
combinations of assumptions that justify strong action [on climate change], depending on 
choices of the [pure rate of social time preference], the elasticity of marginal utility, the costs 
of climate change, the nature of uncertainty, and the way in which we react to this.” 
(Geoffrey Heal, “Climate Economics: A Meta-Review and Some Suggestions,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13927, April 2008, p. 22 and Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, Advance Access, published online on September 24, 
2008.) However, most theoretical approaches require parameterization of various functions, 
so pure theory is unlikely to provide clean answers to the question of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. One particularly difficult problem in estimating the potential for 
catastrophic results is the complicated set of dynamics in geophysical systems, which 
involve lags of decades if not centuries.  
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  We need to begin with a definition of “catastrophic climate change.” Much 
discussion of this topic focuses on environmental or ecological outcomes, for 
example, those concerning sea-level rise or species losses. While these are of great 
concern, we focus here on economic outcomes (including non-market values). In an 
earlier study, I studied high-consequence outcomes, where a high-consequence 
outcome meant a 25 percent loss in global income relative to the baseline 
consumption, sustained indefinitely. 18 For the present estimates, I define a 
catastrophic outcome as one in which world per capita consumption declines at least fifty 
percent below current levels. Since output is generally estimated to grow rapidly over 
the coming century, such a decline is generally at least 90 percent below a reference 
or no-damage level. 
  It should be noted that such an outcome is well outside the range of most 
current studies. The most extreme scenario examined by the Stern Review – “market 
impacts plus risk of catastrophe plus nonmarket impacts” –represents a 32 percent 
decline in output relative to the baseline in 2200. Since per capita output is estimated 
to grow by a factor of 13 over this period, this most extreme Stern Review outcome 
still has a per capita consumption about nine times the level in 2000. So by 
catastrophic, we mean far beyond what is envisioned in the direst of current 
modeling runs. 
  Some possible catastrophic scenarios 
  After experimentation with different assumptions, we settled on the following 
three conditions as important ingredients for leading to extreme outcomes. First, it 
would be necessary either that scientists fail to understand the nature of the climate-
society system in a timely fashion, or that societies fail to take steps to reduce the 
threat of catastrophic climate change. If the threat is understood, then there seems 
little doubt that it is technologically and economically possible to reduce emissions 
to essentially zero in a short time period at costs that might be large but are not 
ruinous. 
  A second condition is that the economic and geophysical systems lead to large 
climatic changes in the absence of effective policy measures. There are many 
 
18  William Nordhaus, “Expert Opinion on Climatic Change,” American Scientist, January-
February 1994, vol. 82, pp. 45-51.  
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combinations of parameters that could lead to the rapid climate change. In our 
simulations below, we will examine only a high temperature sensitivity coefficient 
as an example of unfavorable climatic conditions. 
  A final ingredient is economic or societal damages that are catastrophic at levels 
of climate change that might arise from the first two conditions. Most damage 
functions in the climate-change literature would not lead to catastrophic estimated 
damages as defined here for large temperature changes. A damage function that has 
sharp threshold effects would be required to lead to the catastrophic outcomes. 
  We undertake this approach using the DICE-2007 model. After some 
experiments, and based on other modelers’ results, we identify three important 
parameters that map into the three ingredients discussed above: 
1.  The temperature sensitivity coefficient (“TSC”) 
2.  The convexity of the damage function (“convex”) at a relatively low 
tipping point 
3.  The ability of polities to recognize future consequences and take 
actions that will reduce emissions (“policy”) 
 
Additionally, we will examine the role of the discount rate (the pure rate of social 
time preference), although that would not appear to be a critical part of the answer. 
 
For each of the parameters, we consider a “base value,” which is the one used 
in the standard DICE model, along with an “extreme value,” which represents what 
might happen in an extremely dire outcome. We do not attach any probabilities to 
the extreme outcomes, although our earlier uncertainty estimates would put them at 
the highly improbable level. Table 1 shows the parameters considered in the runs 
below. We make runs for 600 years with different combination of parameters and 
policy assumptions. Technical details on the runs are provided in the Appendix. 
The results for salient variables are shown in Table 2. The first numerical row 
shows the social cost of carbon (SCC) for 2015.  This is a useful indicator of the 
overall social cost of current carbon emissions. The first five columns show the 
results of taking each of the extreme values of the parameters with policy. The SCC 
ranges from $42 per ton of carbon ($/tC) in the standard case to $350 in the most 
unfavorable case. The impact on economic welfare is large but not catastrophic, with 
a decline of around 2 percent of welfare or consumption annuity in the worst case.  
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(The consumption annuity is the constant level of per capita consumption that gives 
the same level of utility as the case in question.) 
The cases without policy are shown in the last four columns of Table 2. A high 
TSC or steep damage plus no policy are not sufficient to lead to the catastrophic 
results. High damages plus no policy (with a tipping point of 3 degrees C) does lead 
to a very steep loss. However, to get genuinely catastrophic results, in the sense used 
here, requires all three conditions: high TSC, extremely convex damage function, 
and no policy, as shown in the last column. When all three of these conditions are 
met, the consumption annuity declines 96.4 percent relative to the baseline. The 
catastrophic nature of the extreme values is signaled by an initial SCC of around 
$5100 per ton C. (Note that using this as a shadow price on CO2 emissions would 
produce a subtraction from “green GDP” that is virtually equal to global net output.) 
An important comparison is the column labeled “1+3+4” with “2+3+4.” This 
shows the importance of policy to avoid the catastrophic outcomes where all 
parameters take their extreme value. Note as well that according to the DICE model 
structure, the world is not yet irreversibly on course for a catastrophic outcome even 
with the most unfavorable parameters. In all cases examined, a vigorous mitigation 
policy is able to prevent the world from going over the catastrophic threshold.19 
Summary of catastrophic simulations 
We can summarize the results as follows: First, None of the extreme 
parameter values taken singly produces catastrophic outcomes. The reason is that 
adding only one extreme value is insufficiently catastrophic. Second, as long as 
mitigation policies are taken quickly and sharply for the catastrophic cases, no 
combination of extreme values is sufficient to lead to catastrophic outcomes. The 
reason is that if nature deals a terrible combination of parameters, then policy moves 
to shut down emissions or even remove CO2 from the atmosphere.  
 
 
19 An interesting question is “How much time do we have?” In the model runs undertaken 
here, with all parameters at their extreme values, it is necessary to move to 100 percent 
emissions reductions within the first eight decades to avoid catastrophic decline. This 
timing is clearly sensitive to the exact details of the threshold, emissions trajectory, TSC, and 
other model parameters.  
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Third, discounting is a second-order issue in the context of catastrophic 
outcomes. A high discount rate will slow mitigation, but it does not by itself 
produce policies that would lead to future catastrophes. If the future outlook is 
indeed catastrophic, that is understood, and policies are taken, the discount rate has 
little effect on the estimate of the social cost of carbon or to the optimal mitigation 
policy. 
 
This leads to the fourth and major finding of our investigation: all of the three 
extreme conditions must hold to obtain the catastrophic outcome. That is to say, there must 
be high temperature sensitivity plus catastrophic damages plus no policy. The 
intuition is that a high TSC produces a steep temperature trajectory. The steep 
temperature trajectory produces catastrophic damages when the damage function is 
extremely convex. But to these we must add that economies do not take steps to 
prevent the chain of catastrophic events. 
 
In the end, the major result is the importance of “policy.” As long as policy is 
not shut down, the world economy can avoid catastrophic outcomes. We should not 
think of policy in a mechanical fashion as simply turning an emissions-control dial 
to the appropriate level and then going about our business. Rather, policy involves a 
series of difficult steps. It requires understanding the complicated geophysical and 
socioeconomic dynamics of climate change and economic growth over many 
decades; it requires solving the global public goods problem by gathering most 
nations together to take collective action; and it means designing a mechanism for 
ensuring that emissions-control policies are reasonably efficient and effective. None 
of these is easily accomplished, but taken together they are sufficient to overcome a 
set of outcomes that would otherwise be catastrophic for the human condition. 
 
 IV.  Summary 
  Martin Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem holds that, under limited conditions 
concerning the structure of uncertainty and preferences, society has an indefinitely 
large expected loss from high-consequence, low-probability events. Under such 
conditions, standard economic analysis cannot be applied. The analysis in the 
present study concludes that Weitzman makes an important point about selection of 
distributions in the analysis of decision-making under uncertainty. However, the  
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conditions necessary for the Dismal Theorem to hold are limited and do not apply to 
a wide range of potential uncertain scenarios. 
  The results of the Dismal Theorem are important in emphasizing that we must 
always be cautious in our assumptions about specific functional forms in empirical 
research – whether those concern the utility functions or the probability 
distributions. There are indeed deep uncertainties about virtually every aspect of the 
natural and social sciences of climate change. But these uncertainties can only be 
resolved by continued careful analysis of data and theories. 









Tipping point (°C) none 3
Policy begins 2015 2255
Pure time discount rate 0.015 0.001
Notes:
"TSC" is the equilibrium response of global mean temperature to a doublin
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations (°C)
"Convex damage component" is a term added to the DICE damage function
that has "tipping point" at specified temperature increase
"Policy begins" indicates that there are no controls until that date, then
controls are optimized after that date.
"Discount rate" is pure rate of social time preference per year.
 
Table 1.  Parameters in standard DICE runs and extreme values 
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Social cost of carbon, 2015 ($/tC) 42 92 80 350 102 44 105 551 5,100
Per capita consumption (2000 $)
Average, 2000-2200 50,338 48,898 50,373 47,534 50,752 48,872 43,254 26,091 5,966
Minimum 2000-2200 6,801 6,799 6,799 6,796 6,799 6,800 6,800 6,800 179
Consumption annuity per capita (c)
Thousands, 2000 $ 17765 17641 17723 17441 (b) 17718 17422 15803 634
Percent decline 0.7% 0.2% 1.8% (b) 0.3% 1.9% 11.0% 96.4%
Objective function
Trillions, 2005 prices 1391.1 1381.3 1387.8 1365.2 (b) 1387.4 1363.7 1218.3 (a)
   Difference from optimal -9.8 -3.3 -25.8 (b) -3.7 -27.3 -172.8 (a)
Percent decline 0.7% 0.2% 1.9% (b) 0.3% 2.0% 12.4% (a)
(a) This value is a large negative number because of non-linear objective function. Refer to consumption annuity.
(b) This value is not comparable to other runs because the discount rate is different from standard cases.
(c) The consumption annuity is the level of constant consumption that yields the same discounted utility as the case under considera
Cases:
1: Optimal policy from 2015
2: Hotelling rents on carbon until 2255, then optimal policy
3: TSC = 10
oC per CO2 doubling
4: Catastrophic damages at tipping point of 3 
oC
5: Social discount rate at 0.1 % per year
Units:
Social cost of carbon in $ per ton carbon, 2000 US $
Per capita consumption in 2000 U.S. international dollars
 
Table 2. Results of alternative extreme values of parameters in DICE model 
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 Appendix. Technical Background on Catastrophic Scenarios 
This appendix provides details on the runs used for the “catastrophic” 
scenarios. The base model is online at the author’s home page at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2007_short.gms. The 
“TSC” changes that parameter (“T2XCO2”) in the model parameters from 3 to 10. 
The “No Policy” runs set the emissions-control rate (“miu”) at the Hotelling scarcity 
rent on carbon fuels for 25 periods (250 years), and then allow optimization after 
that time. The extreme value for the discount rate sets the rate of time preference 
(“B_PRSTP”) at 0.001 per year instead of 0.015 per year. 
The damage convexity is slightly more complicated but is particularly critical 
for the results. For the extreme case we add a sixth-order term to the damage 
function. The specification is somewhat speculative because there is no evidence to 
support such an extreme damage function. The basic idea is that after some “tipping 
point,” damages become very steep. We assume the tipping point is 3 °C above pre-
industrial levels. The exact term that is added is “coefcat*(tatm(t)/3)**expcat” where 
coefcat = 0.1 and expcat = 6. Further note that this term must be added to three 
equations [for dameq(t), yneteq(t), and yy(t)]. The following graph shows the ratio 
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  Note that the GAMS model was unable to solve the most extreme runs because 
of scaling problems. We therefore used an Excel version of the model. The results for 
the most extreme cases are therefore only approximate, but they are so extreme that 
it is hard to believe that current social and political systems would survive, so that 
the model would probably not apply in this situation for other reasons. 
 
 